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L IXTY YEARS AGO the United States—
indeed, most of the world—was in the midst of
the Great Depression. Today, interest in the
Depression’s causes and the failure of govern-
ment policies to prevent it continues, peaking
whenever the stock market crashes or the econ-
omy enters a recession. in the 1930s, dissatisfac-
tion with the failure of monetary policy to pre-
vent the Depression, or to revive the economy,
led to sweeping changes in the structure of the
Federal Reserve System. One of the most impor-
tant changes was the creation of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) to direct open
market policy. Recently Congress has again con-
sidered possible changes in the Federal Reserve
System.’
This article takes a new look at Federal Reserve
policy in the Great Depression. Historical analy-
sis of Fed performance could provide insights
into the effects of System organization on policy
making. The article begins with a macroeconomic
overview of the Depression. It then considers
both contemporary and modern views of the
role of monetary policy in causing the Depression
and the possibility that different policies might
have made it less severe.
Much of the debate centers on whether mone-
tary conditions were “easy” or “tight” during the
Depression—that is, whether money and credit
were plentiful and inexpensive, or scarce and
expensive. During the 1930s, many Fed officials
argued that money was abundant and “cheap,”
even “sloppy,” because market interest rates
were low and few banks borrowed from the dis-
count window. Modern researchers who agree
generally believe neither that monetary forces
were responsible for the Depression nor that
different policies could have alleviated it. Others
contend that monetary conditions were tight,
noting that the supply of money and price level
fell substantially. They argue that a more aggres-
sive response would have limited the Depression.
Among those who conclude that contraction-
ary monetary policy worsened the Depression,
there has been considerable debate about why
“The Monetary Policy Reform Act of 1991” (S. 1611)
would have abolished the FOMC and thereby ended the
voting on open market policy by Federal Reserve Bank
presidents. Although hearings on the bill were held, it was
not brought to a vote before Congress adjourned at the
end of 1991. The Banking Act of 1935 established the
present form of the FOMC, whose members include the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and
the 12 Reserve Bank presidents. Five of the presidents
vote on policy on a rotating basis.Federal Reserve officials failed to respond ap-
propriately. Most explanations fall into two cate-
gories. One holds that Fed officials, though well-
intentioned, failed to understand that more ag-
gressive action was needed. Some researchers,
like Friedman and Schwartz (1963), argue that
the Fed’s behavior during the Depression con-
trasted sharply with its behavior during the
1920s. They contend that the death of Benjamin
Strong in 1928 led to a redistribution of authori-
ty within the System that caused a distinct de-
terioration in Fed performance. Strong, who
was Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York from the System’s founding in 1914
until his death, dominated Federal Reserve policy-
making in the years before the Depression.’
These researchers argue that authority was dis-
persed after his death among the other Reserve
Banks, whose officials were less knowledgeable
and failed to recognize the need for aggressive
policies. Other researchers, like Wicker (1966),
Brunner and Meltzer (1968), and ‘I’emin (1989),
contend that Strong’s death caused no change in
Fed performance. They argue that Strong had
not developed a countercyclical policy and that
he would have failed to recognize the need for
vigorous action during the Depression. in their
view, Fed errors were not due to organizational
flaws or changes, but simply to continued use
of flawed policies.
A second category of explanations holds that
the Fed’s contractionary policy was deliberate.
Epstein and Ferguson (1984) and Anderson,
Shughart and Tollison (1988) contend that Fed
officials understood that monetary conditions
were tight. Epstein and Ferguson assert that the
Fed believed a contraction was necessary and
inevitable. When it did act, they argue, it was to
promote the interests of commercial banks,
rather than economic recovery. Anderson,
Shughart and Tollison emphasize even more the
Fed’s interest in aiding its member banks. They
argue that monetary policy was designed to
cause the failure of nonmember banks, which
would enhance the long-run profits of member
banks and enlarge the System’s regulatory
domain -
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Analysts generally agree that the economic
collapse of the 1930s was extremely severe, if
not the most severe in American history. To
provide a sense of the Depression, Figures 1-3
plot GNP, the price level and the unemployment
rate from 1919 to 1939. As the figures show, af-
ter eight years of nearly continuous expansion,
nominal (current dollar) GNP fell 48 percent
from 1929 to 1933. Real (constant dollar) GNP
fell 33 percent and the price level declined 25
percent. The unemployment rate went from un-
der 4 percent in 1929 to 25 percent in 1933.’
Real GNP did not recover to its 1929 level until
1937. The unemployment rate did not fall below
10 percent until World War H.’
Few segments of the economy were unscathed.
Personal and firm bankruptcies rose to unpre-
cedented highs. In 1932 and 1933, aggregate
corporate profits in the United States were
negative. Some 9,000 banks, with $6.8 billion of
deposits, failed between 1930 and 1933 (see
figure 4). Since some suspended banks eventually
reopened and deposits were recovered, these
figures overstate the extent of the banking dis-
tress.’ Nevertheless, bank failures were numer-
ous and their effects severe, even compared
with the 1920s, when failures were high by
modern standards.
Much of the debate about the causes of the
Great Depression has focused on bank failures.
2until changed by the Banking Act of 1935, the chief ex-
ecutive officers of the Reserve Banks held the title “gover-
nor.” Today these officers are titled “president,” while
members of the Board of Governors, which replaced the
Federal Reserve Board in 1935, now hold the title
“governor.”
‘The appendix provides a list of sources for the data used
in this article. The GNP and unemployment series used
here are standard, but Romer (1986a, 1986b) presents
new estimates of GNP and unemployment for the 1920s.
Both new estimates exhibit less variability than those tradi-
tionally used; Romer’s estimate of the unemployment rate
in 1929 is 4.6 percent, compared with 3.2 percent plotted
here.
4Darby (1976) argues that the unemployment rate series
considerably overstates the true rate after 1933 because it
takes persons employed on government relief projects as
unemployed. Kesselman and Savin (1978) offer an oppos-
ing view. Regardless of which argument is accepted, un-
employment during the 1930s was exceptionally severe,
particularly since there were relatively few multi-income
households.
‘There was no deposit insurance in these years. The Bank-
ing Act of 1933 created federal deposit insurance. During
the 19th and early 20th centuries a number of states ex-
perimented with insurance plans for their state-chartered
banks, but none was still in existence by 1930. See
Calomiris (1989) for a survey of the state systems.Figure 1
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Were they merely a result of falling national in-
come and money demand? Or were they an im-
portant cause of the Depression? Most contempo-
raries viewed bank failures as unfortunate for
those who lost deposits, but irrelevant in macro-
economic significance. Keynesian explanations of
the Depression agreed, including little role for
bank failures. Monetarists like Friedman and
Schwartz (1963), on the other hand, contend
that banking panics caused the money supply to
fall which, in turn, caused much of the decline
in economic activity. Bernanke (1983) notes that
bank failures also disrupted credit markets,
which he argues caused an increase in the cost
of credit intermediation that significantly
reduced national output. In these explanations,
the Federal Reserve bears much of the blame
for the Depression because it failed to prevent
the banking panics and money supply con-
traction.
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Today there is considerable debate about the
causes of business cycles and whether government
policies can alleviate them.” Just as there is no
consensus now, contemporary observers had
many different views about the causes of the
Great Depression and the appropriate response of
government. A few economists, like Irving Fisher
(1932), applied the Quantity Theory of Money,
which holds that changes in the money supply
cause changes in the price level and can affect the
level of economic activity for short periods. These
economists argued that the Fed should prevent



















other extreme, proponents of “liquidationist” the-
ories of the cycle argued that excessively easy
monetary policy in the 1920s had contributed to
the Depression, and that “artificial” easing in
response to it was a mistake. Liquidationists
thought that overproduction and excessive bor-
rowing cause resource misallocation, and that
depressions are the inescapable and necessary
means of correction:
in the course of a boom many bad business
commitments are undertaken. Debts are in-
curred which it is impossible to repay. Stocks
are produced and accumulated which it is im-
possible to sell at a profit. Loans are made
which it is impossible to recover. Both in the
sphere of finance and in the sphere of produc-
tion, when the boom breaks, these bad commit-
ments are revealed. Now in order that
revival may commence again, it is essential that
these positions should be liquidated. -.
One implication of the liquidationist theory is
that increasing the money supply during a
recession is likely to be counterproductive. Dur-
ing a minor recession in 1927, for example, the
Fed had made substantial open market pur-
chases and reduced its discount rate. Adolph
Miller, a member of the Federal Reserve Board,
who agreed with the liquidationist view, testi-
fied in 1931 that:
It lthe 1.927 action) was the greatest and boldest
operation ever undertaken by the Federal
Reserve System, and, in my judgment, resulted
in one of the niost costly errors committed by
it or any banking system in the last 75 years. I
am inclined to think that a different policy at
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‘Lionel Robbins, The Great Depression (1935) [quoted by
Chandler (1971), p. 118].condition at this time. -.-That was a time of
business recession. Business could not use and
was not asking for increased money at that
time.’
in Miller’s view, because economic activity was
low, the reserves created by the Fed’s actions
fueled stock market speculation, which led in-
evitably to the crash and subsequent
depression.
During the Depression, proponents of the Ii-
quidationist view argued against increasing the
money supply since doing so might reignite
speculation without promoting an increase in
real output. Indeed, many argued that the Fed-
eral Reserve had interfered with recovery and
prolonged the Depression by pursuing a policy
of monetary ease. Hayek (1932), for example,
wrote:
It is a fact that the present crisis is marked by
the first attempt on a large scale to revive the
economy.. - by a systematic policy of lowering
the interest rate accompanied by all other possi-
ble measures for preventing the normal process
of liquidation, and that as a result the depres-
sion has assumed more devastating forms and
lasted longer than ever before (p. 130).
Several key Fed officials shared Hayek’s views.
For example, the minutes of the June 23, 1930,
meeting of the Open Market Committee report
the views of George Norris, Governor of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia:
He indicated that in his view the current busi-
ness and price recession was to be ascribed
largely to overproduction and excess productive
capacity in a number of lines of business rather
than to financial causes, and it was his belief
that easier money and a better bond market
would not help the situation but on the con-
trary might lead to further increases in produc-
tive capacity and further overproduction.’
While the liquidationist theory of the business
cycle was commonly believed in the early 1930s,
it died out quickly with the Keynesian revolu-
tion, which dominated macroeconomics for the
next 30 years. Keynesian explanations of the
Depression differed sharply from those of the Ii-
quidationists. Keynesians tended to dismiss
monetary forces as a cause of the Depression or
a useful remedy. instead they argued that
declines in business investment or household
consumption had reduced aggregate demand,
which had caused the decline in economic ac-
tivity.bO Both views, however, agreed that mone-
tary ease prevailed during the Depression.
Friedman and Schwartz renewed the debate
about the role of monetary policy by forcefully
restating the Quantity Theory explanation of the
Depression:
The contraction is. -.a tragic testimonial to the
importance of monetary forces. -- -Different
and feasible actions by the monetary authorities
could have prevented the decline in the stock
of money. --[This] would have reduced the con-
traction’s severity and almost as certainly its du-
ration (pp. 300-01).
Friedman and Schwartz argue that an increase
in the money stock would have offset, if not
prevented, banking panics, and would have led
to increased lending to consumers and business
that would have revived the economy.
Many disagree with the Friedman and Schwartz
explanation, although some recent Keynesian ex-
planations concede that restrictive monetary
policy did play a role in the Depression.h1 Other
studies, such as Field (1984), Hamilton (1987),
and ‘remin (1989), conclude that contractionary
monetary policy in 1928 and 1929 contributed
to the Depression. Bordo (1989) and Wicker
(1989) provide detailed surveys of the monetarist-
Keynesian debate about the causes of the Great
Depression, and interested readers are referred
to them. Since most recent contributions to this
literature emphasize the effects of monetary
policy, a new look at the policies of the Federal
Reserve during the Great Depression is war-
ranted.
‘U.S. Senate (1931), p. 134.
‘Quoted by Chandler (1971), pp. 136-37. De Long (1990)
details the liquidationist cycle theory, and Chandler (1971),
pp. 116-23, has a general discussion of prevailing busi-
ness cycle theories and their prescriptions for monetary
policy.
10See Temin (1976) for a survey of Keynesian explanations
of the Great Depression.
IlMost criticize the Fed’s discount rate increases and failure
to replace reserve losses suffered by banks in the panic
following Great Britain’s departure from the gold standard
in late 1931. See Temin (1976), p. 170, and Kindleberger











A fundamental disagreement within the Feder-
al Reserve System and among outside observers,
even today, is whether monetary policy during
the Depression was easy or tight. Most Fed offi-
cials felt that money and credit were plentiful.
Short-term market interest rates fell sharply af-
ter the stock market crash of 1929 and remained
at extremely low levels throughout the 1930s
(see figure 5). ‘to most observers, the decline in
short-term rates implied monetary ease. Long-
term interest rates declined less sharply,
however, and yields on risky bonds, such as
Baa-rated bonds, rose during the first three
years of the Depression (see figure 5)12 Never-
theless, the exceptionally low yields on short-
term securities has suggested to many observers
an abundance of liquidity.
Other variables also have been interpreted as
indications of easy monetary conditions. Rela-
tively few banks came to the Fed’s discount
window to borrow reserves, for example, and
many banks built up substantial excess reserves
as the Depression progressed (see figure 8)13 To
most observers, it appeared that there was little
demand for credit and, since most policymakers
saw their mission as one of accommodating
l2The short-term rate series through 1933 is the average
daily yield in June of each year on three- to six-month
Treasury notes and certificates, and the yield on Treasury
bills thereafter. The long-term series is the average daily
yield in June of each year on U.S. government bonds.
‘
3
Data on excess reserves before 1929 are not available,
but they were not likely very large.
Baa
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ing credit demand, few believed that more
vigorous expansionary actions were necessary.”
Low interest rates and an apparent lack of de-
mand for reserves have led many researchers
to conclude that tight money did not cause the
Depression. Temin (1976), for example, writes:
There is no evidence of any effective deflation-
ary pressure from the banking system between
the stock-market crash in October 1929 and the
British abandonment of the gold standard in
September 1931. -- -There was no rise in short-
term interest rates in this two-year period. -- -
The relevant record for the purpose of identify-
ing a monetary restriction is the record of
short-term interest rates (p. 169).
Other indicators of monetary conditions,
however, suggest the opposite conclusion. Defla-
tion implied that the value of the dollar rose 25
percent from 1929 to 1933, which Schwartz
14The Federal Reserve System’s founders intended that it
operate according to the Real Bills Doctrine. Fed credit
would be extended primarily through the discount window
as member banks borrowed to finance short-term agricul-
tural or business loans. A decline in economic activity
would reduce discount window borrowing, causing Federal
Reserve credit to decline. By 1924, System policy had
evolved away from a strict Real Bills interpretation, but it
probably continued to have considerable influence on
many Fed officials. See West (1977) or Wicker (1966) for
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(1981) argues reflected exceptionally tight justed for changes in the price level, rose shar-
money. Another indicator, the money stock, fell ply during the Depression (see figure 8).” While
by one-third from 1929 to 1933 (see figure 7)13 the nominal yield on short-term government
Friedman and Schwartz contend that: securities fell to an exceptionally low level,
deflation implied that their real yield rose above
it seems paradoxical to describe as ‘monetary 10 percent in 1930 and 1931. Thus, in contrast
ease’ a policy which permitted the stock of to the apparent signal given by nominal interest
money to decline. --by a percentage exceeded rates, member bank borrowing and excess
only four times in the preceding fifty-four years reserves, the falling money stock and deflation
and then only during extremely severe suggest that monetary conditions were far from
business-cycle contractions (p. 37a). easy.”
And finally, numerous studies point out that the Many economists now conclude that the Fed-
real interest rate, that is, the interest rate ad- eral Reserve should have responded more
“Ml is the sum of coin and currency held by the public and “Yet another indicator is the real money supply, i.e., the
demand deposits. M2 also includes time deposits at com- growth rate of the nominal supply of money less the ex-
mercial banks. pected rate of inflation. Since the price level fell faster
“See Meltzer (1976) and Hamilton (1987), for example. The the Depression, Temiri (1976) argues that
real interest rate plotted in figure 8 is calculated, as the monetary conditions were not tight. The increase in real
prevailing yield on short-term government s!curltles In money balances was relatively slow, however, which
June of each year, less the rate of inflation in the subse- Hamilton (1987) argues was contractionary.
quent year. Since actual, rather than anticipated, inflation
is used to calculate the real rate, it is considered an ex
post, rather than ex ante, rate.“C
Figure 8










vigorously tc the Depression. There is little
agreement, however, about why the Fed did
not. The next sections examine alternative ex-
planations for Federal Reserve behavior during
the Depression.
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Irving Fisher testified before Congress in 1935
that the Depression was severe because “Gover-
nor Strong had died and his policies died with
him. -- -I have always believed, if he had lived,
‘~‘ewould have had a different situation.” Ac-
cording to Fisher, Benjamin Strong had disco-
vered how to use monetary policy to maintain
price level stability, “and for seven years he
maintained a fairly stable price level in this
country, and only a few of us knew what he
was doing. His colleagues did not understand
it.”” In Fisher’s view, Strong adjusted the quan-
tity of money to maintain a stable price level;
had he lived, Fisher says, he would have
prevented the deflation of the 1930s by not al-
lowing the quantity of money to decline.
Friedman and Schwartz agree with Fisher that
Strong’s death caused monetary policy to
change significantly. They argue that Strong’s
aggressive open market purchases and discount
rate reductions in 1924 and 1927 had quickly al-
leviated recessions, hut that his death produced
a sharply different policy during the Depression:
1920 1925 1930 1935
ISU.5. House of Representatives (1935), p. 534. “Ibid, pp. 517-20.If Strong had still been alive and head of the
New York Bank in the fall of 1.930, he would
very likely have recognized the oncoming li-
quidity crisis for what it was, would have been
prepared by experience and conviction to take
strenuous and appropriate nieasures to head it
off, and would have had the standing to carry
the System with him (pp. 412-13).
Friedman and Schwartz make a persuasive
case. Strong was an experienced financial lead-
er. He had served as an officer of Bankers
Trust Company, and during the Panic of 1907
as head of a committee reporting to J. P. Mor-
gan that determined which financial institutions
could be rescued.” He was the first governor of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and
emerged as leader of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tern both because of his personality and stature
in the financial community and because of the
relative importance of New York member banks
in the international financial market.” He chaired
a committee of Federal Reserve Bank governors
that coordinated System open market operations
and represented the System in dealings with
foreign central banks and Congress.22 It is clear
that, with his death, the Fed lost an experienced
and forceful leader.
Some researchers argue, however, that
Strong’s death had little effect on policy. Temin
(1989), for example, writes that “The death of
Strong was a minor event in the history of the
Great Depression” (p. 35). And Brunner and
Meltzer (1968) argue that, “While there is some
evidence that the death of Benjamin Strong con-
tributed to a shift in the balance of power wi-
thin the Federal Reserve. --we find that a
special explanation of monetary policy after
1929 is unnecessary...” (p. 341). The disagree-
ment between these authors and those such as
Fisher, Friedman and Schwartz rests on their
views of whether Strong’s policies would have
prevented the monetary collapse and Depression.
fl.;ç; STRONG’S POLICY?
Much of Strong’s testimony before Congres-
sional committees, as well as other speeches and
writings, suggests that he had developed a poli-
cy of money supply control to limit fluctuations
in the price level. For example, in an unpub-
lished article dated April 1923, he wrote: “If, as
is now universally admitted, prices are in-
fluenced to advance or to decline by increases
or decreases in the total of ‘money’. --then the
task of the System is to maintain a reasonably
stable volume of money and credit 23 And,
in a speech to the American Farm Bureau in
December 1922, he said that monetary policy:
-. should insure that there is sufficient money
and credit available to conduct the business of
the nation and to finance not only the seasonal
increases in demand but the annual or normal
increase in volume I believe that it should
he the policy of the Federal Reserve System, by
the employment of the various means at its
command, to maintain the volume of credit and
currency in this country at such a level so that,
to the extent that the volume has any influence
upon prices, it cannot possibly become the me-
ans for either promoting speculative advances
in prices, or of a depression of prices.”
These statements suggest that Strong would not
have permitted the money supply collapse or
deflation that occurred after 1929.
Other’ aspects of Strong’s testimony, speeches
and writings give different or ambiguous im-
pressions of his views, however, making it
difficult to infer what policies he would have
advocated during the Depression. in testimony
before the House Banking Committee in 1926,
Strong described the relationship between Fed
policy and the quantity of bank deposits, dis-
cussing in detail the multiplier relationship be-
tween bank reserves and deposits.” But he also
“Chandler (1958), pp. 27-28.
‘1The Federal Reserve Act gave the individual Reserve
Banks authority to initiate discount rate changes and open
market operations. The Federal Reserve Board could ap-
prove or disapprove these actions, but its role was primari-
ly supervisory, with no clear authority to determine policy.
Because of this, and perhaps because it lacked forceful
leaders, the Board did not dominate policy making until af-
ter the System was restructured by the Banking Act of
1935. See Wheelock (forthcoming) for details of this reor-
ganization.
“Initially, each Reserve Bank determined its own open mar-
ket operations. But Treasury Department complaints that
they made it difficult to price new debt issues and a grow-
ing understanding of the impact of open market operations
on economic activity, ted the Banks to form a “Governors
Committee” to coordinate open market operations. This
committee was replaced in 1923 by the Open Market In-
vestment Committee, which Strong headed until his death.
23”Prices and Price Control,” in Burgess (1930), pp. 229-30.
‘4Ouoted by Chandler (1958), p. 200.
“U.S. House of Representatives (1926), pp. 334-35.testified that, “when it comes to a decline of
price level, the origin of which can not be at-
tributed to a credit policy, this effort that you
make by a credit policy to arrest a fall of prices
may do more harm than good “ it is also
difficult to interpret his writing that “the task of
the System is to maintain a reasonably stable
volume of money and credit, with due al-
lowancesfor seasonalfluctuations in demand,for
normal annual growth in the country’s develop-
ment.. and with such allowance as may be im-
posed by those great cycles of prosperity and
depression “ What sort of allowance for
fluctuations does he mean? This statement could
be read as advocating an increase or a decrease
in money in response to a decline in economic
activity. The latter is suggested by the following
statement: “there should be no such excessive
or artificial supplies of money and credit as will
simply permit the marking up of prices when
there is no increase in business or production
to warrant an increase in the volume of money
and credit.” This sounds like the warnings by
some officials during the Depression that mone-
tary expansion would be inflationary or cause
speculation because economic activity was low.
Strong also seems to have concluded that the
deflation from mid-1920 to 1921 had positive
effects:
The deflation which took place in the United
States following the collapse of prices resulted
in extricating the reserve system—the whole
monetary system of the country—from a posi-
tion of permanent entanglement. --and I think
that was one of the fortunate results of the
policy. -- -One of the results of this liquida-
tion. -.has been to put this country on as
sound or a sounder monetary basis than any
other country in the world, without the in-
troduction of a lot of money or credit into cir-
culation, based solely upon the Government
debt to the bank of issue. I mean to explain
that there have been offsetting advantages to
that deflation. --
This quotation suggests that Strong might have
found similar offsetting advantages to the defla-
tion that followed the stock market crash in
1929 and might have been reluctant to expand
the money supply through purchases of govern-
ment securities.
These quotations illustrate the ambiguity of
many of Strong’s statements and the difficulty
of inferring what policies he would have pur-
sued in the 1930s. To determine whether mone-
tary policy was changed by Strong’s death, it is
probably more instructive to examine the poli-
cies he actually implemented.
Two aspects of Strong’s policies have received
attention from scholars studying Federal
Reserve behavior. First, beginning in the early
1920s, the System offset or “sterilized” gold
flows and other changes in reserve funds by al-
tering the volume of Fed credit outstanding.”
This policy limited fluctuations in bank reserves
and, thus, in the money supply and price level.
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp.
394-99, however, the Fed permitted gold out-
flows during the Depression to reduce bank
reserves and the money supply and more than
offset gold inflows. What had been an essential-
ly neutral policy, therefore, became a contrac-
tionary policy after Strong’s death.
Miron (1988) argues that a similar change oc-
curred in the Fed’s accommodation of seasonal
credit and currency demands. From the Sys-
tem’s inception, Federal Reserve credit was sup-
plied to prevent seasonal demands from
draining bank reserves and increasing interest
rates. According to Miron, the Fed was less ac-
commodative after 1928, which contributed to
the frequency of financial crises during the
Depression.”
Beyond the offsetting of gold and currency
flows, a second aspect of Strong’s policies has
received considerable attention. In 1924 and
1927, the Fed made large open market pur-
chases and discount rate reductions that were
followed by increases in bank reserves and the
“Ibid, p. 577.
“‘Prices and Price Control,” April 1923, in Burgess (1930),
p. 230 (italics added).
“From a speech to the American Farm Bureau in 1922
[quoted by Chandler (1958), p. 200].
“U.S. House of Representatives (1926), p. 309.
“Federal Reserve credit is supplied by Fed purchases of
securities and discount window lending (member bank bor-
rowing). It consists also of some miscellaneous compo-
nents, such as float. In this era, the Federal Reserve pur-
chased both U.S. government securities and bankers ac-
ceptances (at fixed acceptance buying rates), and discount
window lending consisted of both rediscount of eligible
paper and advances to member banks at the discount
rate.
‘1Miron does not test this claim except to show that Federal
Reserve credit was somewhat less seasonal after 1928
than before.money supply. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
argue that the Fed’s purpose was to combat
recessions and that its failure to respond as ag-
gressively during the Depression reflected ‘a dis-
tinct change in System behavior. Other
researchers, however, such as Wicker (1966)
and Brunner and Meltzer (1968), find no incon-
sistency in Fed behavior, arguing that the com-
paratively weak response to the Depression was
in fact predictable from the policy strategy de-
veloped by Strong.
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Before entering World War I, the United
States absorbed large gold inflows that added
directly to bank reserves and caused a signifi-
cant money supply increase.” Although inflows
ceased after America entered the war, bank
reserves and the money supply continued to in-
crease rapidly as Federal Reserve credit was ex-
tended to help finance the war. After the war,
gold outflows reduced the reserves of the
Reserve Banks, leading them to raise their dis-
count rates and thereby restrict credit to mem-
ber banks.3’ The resulting decline in Fed credit
coincided with a sharp decline in the money
supply and deflation.’~
Following the violent inflation-deflation cycle
of 1917-21, the Fed began to intervene to pre-
vent gold flows from affecting bank reserves.”
In testimony before the House Committee on
Banking and Currency, Strong gave a clear ex-
planation of this policy, presenting charts show-
ing the relationship between gold fiovvs, Fed
credit, bank reserves and the price level.” He
explained:
In the old days there was a direct relation be-
tween the country’s stock of gold, bank deposits
and the price level because bank deposits
were. --based upon the stock of gold and bore
a constant relationship to the gold stock, and
the volume of bank deposits and the general
price level were similarly related. But in recent
years the relationship between gold and bank
deposits is no longer as close or direct as it
was, because the Federal Reserve System has
given elasticity to the country’s bank reserves.
Reserve Bank credit has become the equivalent
of gold in its power to serve as the basis of
bank credit. .--Hence. --the present basis for
bank credit consists of gold plus Federal
Reserve credit. Federal Reserve bank credit is
an elastic buffer between the country’s gold
supply and bank credit.”
Strong credited the Federal Reserve System for
preventing inflation in 1921 and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into
the United States in 1921 and 1922, many
economists abroad, and in this country as well,
expected that this inward flow of gold would
result in a huge credit expansion and a serious
price inflation. That no such expansion or infla-
tion has taken place is due to the fact that the
amount of Federal Reserve credit in use was
diminished as the gold imports continued. Thus,
in the broad picture of financial events in this
country since 1920, the presence of the Reserve
System may be said to have prevented rather
than fostered inflation.”
Figure 9 illustrates the policy of offsetting
gold and currency flows during the 1920s.”
The shaded insert on pages 18-19 describes the
mechanics of this policy. Since gold is a source
of banking system reserves, gold inflows, unless
offset, add to the stock of reserves. A gold in-
flow thus has the same effect on reserves as a
“The accompanying shaded insert discusses the sources
and uses of reserve funds and explains the mechanics of
the Fed’s sterilization policy.
“The Reserve Banks were required to maintain gold
reserves of 40 percent against their note issues and 35
percent against deposits. A discount rate increase was in-
tended to reduce discount loans and, thus, the Fed’s note
and deposit liabilities, as well as encourage gold inflows
as investors sought higher yields in the United States.
“In January 1916, the All Commodities Price Index stood at
112.8 (1913t 100). In April 1917 (when the United States
entered the war), it was at 172.9. At its peak in May 1920,
the Index was at 246.7. It then fell to a low of 138.3 in
January 1922.
“Before the war, the Fed lacked the resources to offset
gold inflows, so sterilization was impossible. By the end of
1921, the Reserve Banks had sufficient reserves to reduce
their discount rates, and individually they began to pur-
chase government securities. By 1923, there seems to
have been a conscious effort to offset gold flows [Fried-
man and Schwartz (1963), pp. 279-87].
“These charts are reproduced by Hetzel (1985), p. 7, who
examines Strong’s unwillingness to support legislation that
would require the Fed to adopt a price level stabilization
rule.
“U.S. House of Representatives (1926), p. 470.
“Ibid, p.471.
“In practice, the Fed also offset changes in other sources
and uses of reserve funds, but gold and currency flows
were the most substantial; the others can be ignored for il-
lustrative purposes.Figure 9
Gold and Currency Sterilization
January 1924 to February 1933
I 1929 I 1930 I 1931 I 1932
Federal Reserve purchase of securities. Currency
held by the public is a use of reserves: in-
creases in public currency holdings reflect
reserve withdrawals from banks. Thus, if not
offset, an increase in currency would correspond
to a decrease in bank reserves. The difference
between gold and currency is plotted in figure 9.
It is clear that net increases (decreases) in this
difference were largely offset by declines (in-
creases) in Fed credit outstanding, so that total
bank reserves changed relatively little.
It is also clear that Benjamin Strong’s death
did not interrupt the offsetting of gold and cur-
rency flows, at least until the fourth quarter of
1931. The money supply contraction and defla-
tion during the first two years of the Depres-
sion were not caused by a decline in bank
reserves. Instead, as figure 10 illustrates, the
money supply fell because the money multiplier
declined.~° This was particularly true beginning
in the fourth quarter of 1930, when banking
panics caused marked increases in the
currency-deposit and reserve-deposit ratios.”
‘The relative stability of bank reserves ended
abruptly in September 1931. On September 21,
Great Britain left the gold standard. Speculation
“The multiplier plotted in figure 10 equals (1 + k)/(r + k),
where k is the ratio of currency held by the public to de-
mand deposits and r is the ratio of bank reserves to
deposits. The multiplier is defined as the money supply
(here M2) divided by the monetary base, or ‘high-powered
money,” which is the sum of bank reserves and currency
held by banks and the public.
4’Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 340-42, conclude that
the money supply decline between August 1929 and Oc-
tober 1930 was caused by a decline in the monetary base.
This decline was due to a decrease in currency, not bank
reserves. Thereafter, the base rose, but less than neces-
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48.000
that the United States would soon follow led to
a large withdrawal of foreign deposits from
American banks and a consequent gold out-
flow.~’In the six weeks ending October 28,
1931, the gold stock declined $727 million (15
percent).” The Fed raised its discount and ac-
ceptance buying rates, hoping that an increase
in domestic interest rates would halt the gold
outflow by raising the relative yield of U.S.
financial assets. This action was hailed as
demonstrating the Fed’s resolve to maintain gold
convertibility of the dollar, and the gold outflow
ceased.
Banks continued to lose reserves, however, as
depositors panicked and converted deposits into
currency. Member banks were able to partially
offset the reserve outflows by borrowing and
by selling acceptances to the Reserve Banks, al-
beit at the recently increased discount and ac-
ceptance buying rates. But the Fed made only
trivial purchases of government securities, and,
in all, Federal Reserve member banks suffered a
$540 million (22 percent) loss of reserves be-
tween September 16, 1931, and February 24,
1932.~’
“If the United States had left the gold standard, it is likely
that the dollar would have depreciated against gold and
other currencies that remained linked to gold. This would
have meant an immediate loss ofwealth in terms of gold
for anyone holding dollar-denominated assets.
~‘Boardof Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943),
p. 386.
“Non-borrowed reserves declined $1112 million (52 per-
cent), while discount loans (borrowed reserves) increased
$572 million.
Multiplier
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currency outflows suffered by banks permitted
the money supply contraction to accelerate. Fed
officials claimed that the Reserve Banks’ lack of
reserves precluded government security pur-
chases to offset the reserve losses suffered by
banks45 The Reserve Banks were required to
maintain gold reserves equal to 40 percent of
their note issues and reserves of either gold or
‘eligible paper” against the remaining 60 per-
cent4°Since gold outflows had reduced the Sys-
tem’s reserve holdings, and since the System
lacked other eligible paper, Fed officials asserted
they could not increase Fed credit by purchas-
ing government securities, which were not eligi-
ble collateral.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 399-406,
dispute the Fed’s justification for not buying
government securities. They argue that the Sys-
tem had sufficient gold reserves and, in any
event, that the Federal Reserve Board had the
power to suspend the reserve requirements
temporarily. Epstein and Ferguson (1984),
pp. 964-65, contend, however, that Fed officials
did feel constrained by a lack of gold. Wicker
(1966), pp. 169-70, suggests that Fed officials
feared that open market purchases would
weaken confidence in the Fed’s determination to
maintain gold convertibihty and thereby renew
the gold outflow.
In any case, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 re-
moved the constraint by permitting government
securities to serve as collateral for Federal
Reserve note issues. In March 1932, the System
began what was then the largest open-market
purchase program in its history.~~ Between
February 24 and July 27, 1932, the Fed bought
$1.1 billion of government securities. Member
bank reserves increased only $194 million in
these months, however, because of renewed
gold and currency outflows and a reduction in
member bank borrowing. Moreover, the supply
of money continued to fall because of a sharp
decline in the money multiplier (see figure 10).~~
45See the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. Annual Report (1932), pp. 16-19.
46Eligible paper consisted of either bankers acceptances or
commercial notes acquired by direct purchase or pledged
by member banks as collateral for discount loans. See
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943),
pp. 324-29, and Friedman and Schwartz (1963), p. 400.
4TWhy the Fed undertook these purchases is unclear, espe-
why purchases were not made immediately following Bri-
tain’s departure from gold. Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
pp. 384-89, argue that the Fed succumbed to pressure
from Congress, while Epstein and Ferguson (1984) con-
clude that pressure from both Congress and commercial
banks was important.
~Duringthese months, both the reserve-deposit and
currency-deposit ratios rose.
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3From 1917 to 1960. such deposits were the only form
in whicn member banks were permitted to hold their he-
cialby if fear of undermining the gold standard explainsThe Fed ended its purchase program in July
1932, largely because officials believed it had
done little good.49 Bank reserves continued to
increase) however) as gold inflows were not off-
set by a corresponding reduction in Fed credit
outstanding. Although the money supply ceased
to fall, it also failed to rise significantly. in early
1933, large gold and currency outflows caused
a renewed money supply decline.~° On this oc-
casion, the crisis was stopped by Franklin U.
Roosevelt’s decision to declare a Bank Holiday
and suspend gold shipments. In essence, the
Fed’s failure to insulate the banking system
from gold outflows and panic currency with-
drawals had caused the president to act to pre-
vent further reserve losses.
While failure to sterilize gold and currency
outflows in 1931 and 1933 was inconsistent
with previous actions, it did not represent a
fundamental change in regime. Fed officials ap-
parently believed strongly in the gold standard,
and there seems to have been no discussion of
following Great Britain off gold. Benjamin
Strong had been a committed advocate of the
gold standard, and it seems doubtful that he
would have proposed actions that might have
weakened it.’” As an institution, the Federal
Reserve System was willing to forego short-run
stability to preserve the gold standard, which it
saw as its fundamental mission.’”
Reserve sterilization constituted one aspect of
System policy begun under Strong, and the Fed
deviated little from the policy after his death, at
least until the fourth quarter of 1931. In fact,
from the stock market crash in October 1929 to
Britain’s departure from gold on September 21,
1931, the Fed did little but offset gold and cur-
rency flows. It certainly did not make large
open market purchases, despite the deepening
depression. On the surface, this lack of vigor
appears at odds with the relatively large open
market purchases the Fed made during the
minor recessions of 1924 and 1927.
The Fed’s actions in 1924 mark its first use of
open market operations to achieve general poli-
cy objectives. In that year, the Fed purchased
$450 million of government securities and cut
its discount rate (in three stages) from 4.5 per-
cent to 3 percent. In testimony before the
House Banking Committee in 1926, Benjamin
Strong listed several reasons for these actions,
including the following:
1) To accelerate the process of debt repay-
ment to the Federal Reserve Banks by the
member banks, so as to relieve this weaken-
ing pressure for loan liquidation.
2) ‘Jo give the Federal Reserve Banks an asset
which would not be automatically liquidated
as the result of gold imports so that later, if
inflation developed from excessive gold im-
ports, it might at least be checked in part by
selling these securities, thus forcing member
banks again into debt to the Reserve Banks
and making the Reserve Bank discount rate
effective.
3) To facilitate a change in the interest rela-
tion between the New York and London mar-
kets. -.by establishing a somewhat lower
level of interest rates in this country at a
time when prices were falling generally and
when the danger of a disorganizing price ad-
vance in commodities was at a minimum and
remote.
4) By directing foreign borrowings to this
market to create the credits which would be
necessary to facilitate the export of com-
modities. -
5) To render what assistance was possible by
our market policy toward the recovery of
sterling and the resumption of gold payment
by Great Britain.
6) To check the pressure on the banking situ-
ation in the west and northwest and the
resulting failures and disasters.’~
‘9Banks’ excess reserves increased substantially during the
months of the open market purchases, which many saw as
idle balances that were unneeded and potentially inflation-
ary. See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 385-89. As
discussed below, Epstein and Ferguson (1984) suggest
that pressure from commercial banks contributed to the
Fed’s decision to end the program.
~°Themoney supply fell both because of a decline in
reserves and a decline in the money multiplier induced by
panic deposit withdrawals.
5’Strong testified before the House Banking Committee in
1928 that, When you are speaking of efforts simply to
stabilize commerce, industry, agriculture, employment and
soon, without regard to the penalties of violation of the
gold standard, you are talking about human judgment and
the management of prices which I do not believe in at all.”
lOuoted by Burgess (1930), pp. 331.1 See also Temin
(1989), p. 35.
‘“See Temin (1989), pp. 28-29 and 76-87, and Wheebock
(1991).
‘“U.S. House of Representatives (1926), p. 336,The Fed undertook a second large purchase
program in 1927, purchasing $300 million of
government securities and reducing the dis-
count rate again. Strong left no written justifica-
tion for these operations. Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) argue that they were made in
response to a recession, and that the 1924 pur-
chases had also been intended to bring about a
domestic recovery. Wicker (1966), pp. 77-94 and
106-16, challenges this interpretation, arguing
that the actions were motivated by international
considerations. According to Wicker, the pur-
chases in 1924 were intended to encourage the
flow of gold to Britain by reducing U.S. interest
rates relative to those in London, with the goal
of assisting Britain’s return to the gold standard.
The 1927 purchases were intended to help Bri-
tain through a payments crisis, again by direct-
ing capital toward London; these purchases
followed closely a meeting between Strong and
European central bank heads.
Chandler (1958), p. 199, argues that both
domestic and international goals were important
in 1924 and 1927, and Wheelock (1991), ch. 2,
finds empirical support for this view. Wheelock
also shows that, relative to the decline in eco-
nomic activity, the Fed made substantially fewer
open market purchases in 1930 and 1931 than
it did during 1924 and 1927. This might reflect
a significant change in System behavior between
the 1920s and early 1930s. But an analysis of
the Fed’s policy methods suggests that its anem-
ic response in 1930-31 might also be explained
as the consistent use of a single strategy.
During the early 1920s, the Fed developed a
strategy of using open market operations and
discount rate changes to affect the level of
member bank discount window borrowing. Fed
officials observed that, when the System pur-
chased government securities, member bank
borrowing tended to decline by nearly the same
amount and, sinsilarly, that open market sales
led to comparable increases in member bank
borrowing. But, while the Fed’s operations had
little impact on the total volume of Fed credit
outstanding, they appeared to have a significant
impact on money markets. Accorcling to Chan-
dler (1958):
Federal Reserve officials soon discovered.
much to their amazement at first, that open
market purchases and sales brought about
marked changes in money market conditions
even though total earning assets of the Reserve
Banks remained unchanged. When the Federal
Reserve sold securities and extracted money
fi-om bank reserves, more banks were forced to
hot-row from the Reserve Banks, and those al-
ready borrowing were forced niore deeply into
debt. Since banks had to pay interest on their
borrowings and did not like to remain continu-
ously in debt, they tended to lend less liberally,
which raised interest rates in the market
pp. 238-39).
Strong testified that “the effect of open market
operations is to increase or decrease the extent
to which the member banks must of their own
initiative call on the Reserve Bank for
credit ~ Security purchases led to less mem-
ber bank borrowing and lower interest rates,
while sales increased borrowing and rates.55
Strong believed that monetary policy could
stimulate economic activity by easing money
market conditions:
.[Wlhen we have very cheap money, corpora-
tions and individuals borrow money in order to
extend their businesses. That results in plant
construction; plant construction employs more
labor, brings in to use more materials. -.-It
may cause some elevation of wages. It creates
more spending power; and with that start it
will permeate through into the trades and the
general price level.’~
Chandler (1958) and Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) conclude that under Strong’s leadership
the Federal Reserve System attempted to stimu-
late economic activity during recessions by
promoting monetary ease (cheap money). This
explains why Strong listed “to accelerate the
process of debt repayment. -.by the member
banks” as a reason for the open market pur-
~4lbid,p. 468.
‘“Presumably, discount rate changes alone could achieve
the same impact on interest rates, but the Fed preferred to
precede discount rate changes with open market opera-
tions. Strong testified that “the foundation for rate
possible otherwise, and the effect is less dramatic and
less alarming. --than if we just make advances and
reductions in our discount rate.” [U.S. House of Represen-
tatives (1926), p. 3331-
‘“U.S. House of Representatives (1926), pp. 578-79.
changes can be more safely and better laid by these
preliminary operations in the open market than would beTable 1
Fed Policy During Three Recessions
(dollar amounts in millions)
Date AlP GS DR.DL DI4NYC)
1929 Jut 124 $147 5.0% $1096 $319
Oct 118 154 60 885 74
1930 Jan 106 485 4.5 501 39
Apr 104 530 35 231 17
Jul 93 583 25 226 0
Oct 88 602 25 196 6
1931 Jan 83 647 2.0 253 5
Apr 88 600 2.0 155 0
Jul 82 674 15 169 0
Oct 73 733 3,5 614 74
1923Apr 106 229 45 658 123
Jul 104 97 45 834 143
Oct 99 91 45 873 121
1924 Jan 100 118 45 574 85
Apr 95 274 4.5 489 45
Jul 84 467 35 315 13
Oct 95 585 3.0 240 28
1925 Jan 105 464 3.0 275 32
1926 Oct 111 306 4.0 663 84
1927 Jan 107 310 4.0 481 76
Apr 10$ 341 40 447 78
Jul 106 381 4.0 454 59
Oct 102 506 3.5 424 75
1928 Jan 107 512 3.5 465 94
Variable definitions. AlP: Index of Industrial Production
(seasonallyadjusted); GS.Federal Reserve governmentsecu-
rity holdings, DR: discount rate ofthe Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; DL: discount loans (member bank borrowing)
of all Federal Reserve member banks, DL(NYC): discount
loans of reporting banks in New York City.
chases in 1924. Strong used the level of mem-
ber bank borrowing to determine the specific
quantity of security purchases necessary to
bring about monetary ease:
Should we go into a business recession while
the member- banks were continuing to borrow
directly 500 or 600 million dollars. .-we should
consider taking steps to relieve some of the
pressure which this borrowing induces by pur-
chasing Government securities and thus ena-
bling member banks to reduce their
indebtedness. ..-As a guide to the timing and
extent of any purchases which might appear
desirable, one of our best guides would be the
amount of borrowing by member banks in prin-
cipal centers. .-.Our experience has shown
that when New York City banks
are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 mil-
lion dollars or more, there is then some real
pressure for reducing loans, and money rates
tend to he markedly higher than the discount
rate. On the other hand, when borrowings of
these banks are negligible, as in 1924, the
money situation tends to be less elastic and if
gold imports take place, there is liable to he
some credit inflation, with money rates drop-
ping below our discount rate. When member
banks are owing us about 50 million dollars or
less the situations appears to be comfortable,
with no marked pressure for liquidation. ..
Table 1 compares Federal Reserve actions dur-
ing the 1924, 1927 and 1930-31 downturns. The
Fed’s index of industrial production indicates
the severity of each recession. Following the
stock market crash in October 1929, the New
York Fed purchased $160 million of government
securities and, by the end of December, the Sys-
tem had purchased an additional $150 million.
But, from January 1930 to October 1931, the
Fed made only modest purchases, particularly in
comparison with those made in 1924 and 1927,
when the declines in economic activity were
less.
The relatively small purchases in 1930 and
1931 appear consistent, however, with the use
of member bank borrowing as a policy guide.
1’his, according to Brunner and Meltzer (1968),
explains the Fed’s failure to respond aggressive-
ly to the Depression.58 Member bank borrowing
fell substantially following the stock market
crash in October 1929 and averaged just $241
million from January 1930 to August 1931. Bor-
rowing by reporting member banks in New
York City averaged just $8 million over the
same months. Thus, by Strong’s guidelines,
money was exceptionally easy and substantial
open market operations were unwarranted.
The Fed’s use of member bank borrowing as
a guide to monetary conditions could explain
t7Presentation to the Governors’ Conference, March 1926
[quoted by Chandler (1958), pp. 239-401.
‘“Wicker (1969) agrees that, to the extent that the Fed
responded to domestic conditions, it used member bank
borrowing as a guide. See also Mebtzer (1976).why it permitted the money supply to decline
sharply during the Depression. During a reces-
sion, loan demand declines and banks have fewer
profitable investment opportunities. Consequent-
ly, the demand for borrowed reserves declines.
If this decline in demand is not offset, total
reserves and the money supply fall. In a minor
recession, as in 1924 and 1927, member bank
borrowing falls little. The Fed’s guidelines would
have suggested that monetary conditions were
relatively tight and, in response, it would have
made large open market purchases. In a severe
economic downturn, as in 1930-31, however,
member bank borrowing may fall substantially.
But, by Strong’s rule the Fed would have made
few open market purchases. Thus, ironically,
this strategy could result in a greater contrac-
tion in the supply of money, the more severe a
decline in economic activity.58
If, as Brunner and Meltzer (1968) argue, Sys-
tem officials followed Strong’s prescription to
use the level of bank borrowing to guide policy
during the Depression, then it seems that the
Fed made no fundamental change in policy after
Strong’s death.
Although Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
pp. 362-419, believe that Strong would have re-
sponded aggressively to the Depression, they
agree that a majority of Fed officials interpreted
the low level of member bank borrowing in
1930 and 1931 as signaling monetary ease. They
contend, however, that officials of the New
York Fed understood the flaws in using member’
bank borrowing as a policy guide and would
have pursued appropriately expansionary poli-
cies if they had the authority.60
In March 1930 the Open Market Investment
Committee, which consisted of five Reserve
Bank governors, was replaced by the Open Mar-
ket Policy Conference, in which representatives
of all 12 Banks participated. ‘The Investment
Committee had been led by Benjamin Strong,
and then by George Harrison, Strong’s successor
as governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. Friedman and Schwartz, p. 414, contend
that the Policy Conference was established to
wrest power from the New York Bank. And
they show, pp. 367-80, that New York officials
proposed more expansionary actions, particular-
ly in 1930, than were accepted by the rest of
the System. Wicker (1966) finds, however, that
Harrison ceased to advocate open market pur-
chases once New York banks were no longer
borrowing reserves. Thus, while the Federal
Reserve would likely have pursued somewhat
more expansionary policies had New York offi-
cials held more authority, the modest open mar-
ket purchases of 1930 and 1931 were
apparently consistent with the guidelines out-
lined by Strong.
In sum, during the Depression, the Federal
Reserve continued to sterilize gold and currency
flows and made limited open market purchases
and discount rate reductions in response to the
economic decline. Notable deviations from these
policies occurred, such as the incomplete sterili-
zation of gold outflows during the crises of
1931 and 1933. But it seems likely that mone-
tary policy would have been somewhat more
responsive to the Depression, particularly in
1930, had officials of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York been able to dominate policymak-
ing in the way Strong had before his death.8~
The general thrust of policy, however, appears




Until recently, most studies of Fed behavior
have concluded that policymakers failed to per-
ceive a need to take expansionary actions,
despite deflation, rising unemployment and
widespread bank failures. Some researchers
now argue, however, that Fed officials were
quite aware that their policies were contribut-
ing to the contraction. These researchers con-
clude that policymakers responded to interest
group pressure and their own lesire for in-
‘“Indeed, except for a brief decline in Ml in 1927, the abso-
lute quantity of money did not fall in 1924 or 1927, although
its rate of increase declined. The Fed’s strategy and the
consequences of using bank borrowing as a policy guide
are examined in greater detail in Wheelock (1991), ch. 3.
‘“See also Schwartz (1981), pp. 41-42.
policies, particularly in 1927, had contributed to stock mar-
ket speculation and the crash and depression that fol-
lowed. See Wheelock (1991), ch. 4, for analysis of
disagreements among System officials during the
Depression.
efl~ is by no means clear that Strong could have retained
this degree of influence, as many officials believed that hisfluence, rather than the public interest. Epstein
and Ferguson (1984), for example, contend that
a combination of ideology and conflicting in-
terests explain the System’s policy. And Ander-
son, Shughart and Tollison (1988) argue that
“the restrictive monetary policy of the Fed in
the 1929-33 period was not based on myopia
but instead on rational, self-interested behavior”
(p. 4).
Epstein and Ferguson (1984) focus their study
on the Federal Reserve’s $1.1 billion open mar-
ket purchase program of 1932. They ask why
the Fed waited so long to begin an expansionary
program, what had changed to cause the Fed to
begin the program when it did, and what led to
the decision to end the program.
To the first question, Epstein and Ferguson
(1984) conclude that the liquidationist business
cycle theory was dominant among Fed officials.
Liquidationists believed that depressions were
“vital to the long-run health of a capitalist econ-
omy. Accordingly, the task of central banking
was to stand back and allow nature’s therapy to
take its course.” (p. 963). This certainly was the
opinion of some key officials, such as George
Norris, who argued at the September 25, 1930,
meeting of the Open Market Policy Conference:
We believe that the correction must come
about through reduced production, reduced in-
ventories, the gradual reduction of consumer
credit, the liquidation of security loans, and the
accumulation of savings through the exercise of
thrift. These are slow and simple remedies, but
just as there is no ‘royal road to knowledge,’ we
believe there is no short cut or panacea for the
rectification of existing conditions. --
We have been putting out credit in a period of
depression, when it was not wanted and could
not be used, and will have to withdraw credit
when it is wanted and can be used.’”
Norris clearly believed that monetary policy had
been too stimulative and was interfering with
the natural process of liquidation and recovery.
Strong and other officials apparently held
similar views during the recession of 1920-21.
According to Wicker (1966):
26
In the view of System officials the money sup-
ply in 1920 was redundant (excessive) and
should decline to restore the ‘proper’ relation-
ship between prices, credit, and volume of
production. The term most frequently used to
describe this process was ‘liquidation,’ the
necessity for which was not disputed by either
the Board or by any other Federal Reserve offi-
cial including Benjamin Strong. - (p. 49).
Most researchers argue that Strong’s views
changed significantly after the 1920-21 episode,
however. Chandler (1958) writes:
Like most other Federal Reserve officials, [in
1920-1921 Strongl believed that some deflation
of bank credit was essential and that some
price reduction was inevitable and desirable.
Within three years, Strong himself had rejected
many of these ideas. A much smaller business
recession in 1924 led him to advocate large and
aggressive open-market purchases of govern-
ment securities and reductions of discount rates
to combat deflation at home as well as to en-
courage foreign lending (p. 181)65
In rejecting the importance of Strong’s death,
Epstein and Ferguson (1984) implicitly deny that
Strong sought to prevent loan liquidation during
recessions by pursuing monetary ease or that
he subscribed to the countercyclical policy guide-
lines he presented to the Governors Conference
in 1926: “Should we go into a business reces-
sion. --we should consider taking steps to
relieve. --the pressure. --by purchasing
Government securities 64
Epstein and Ferguson emphasize two addition-
al reasons for the timing and extent of Fed ac-
tions during the Depression. First, in contrast to
Friedman and Schwartz, they conclude that a
lack of gold reserves did keep the Fed from
making open market purchases in the fourth
quarter of 1931. They argue further that, while
the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 lessened the
problem for the System as a whole, some of the
Reserve Banks were reluctant to continue the
purchase program in 1932 because they lacked
sufficient gold reserves.65
Second, Epstein and Ferguson argue that Fed
concern with member bank profits contributed
‘“Quoted in Chandler (1971), p. 137.
‘“See also Friedman and Schwartz (1963), pp. 249-54, Wick-
er (1966), pp. 57-66, and West (1977), pp. 173-204.
‘“Quoted by Chandler (1958), p. 239-40.
‘“Each Reserve Bank was required to maintain its own
reserves. Pooling was not permitted, although the Banks
could lend to one another.to the timing and extent of open market pur-
chases in 1932. During the first two years of
the Depression, leading bankers generally ar-
gued for loan liquidation and lower wages. But
the sharp increase in interest rates in the
fourth quarter of 1931 reduced the value of
bond portfolios and threatened the solvency of
many banks. Bankers then began to press the
Fed to support bond prices. Epstein and Fergu-
son argue that “a major goal of the [purchases
of 1932] was to revive railroad bond values.
and bond prices in general.” (p. 967).
Just as constituent pressure contributed to the
decision to make open market purchases, it also
seems to have caused the program’s end. Dur-
ing the Depression banks generally had shifted
their bond portfolios toward short-term maturi-
ties. And, while the need to support bond prices
was paramount in early 1932, as the year
progressed short-term interest rates fell sharply
and bank earnings declined. The decline in
earnings was especially acute in Boston and
Chicago because banks in those cities had un-
usually large holdings of short-term securities.
Epstein and Ferguson conclude: “That the gover-
nors of the Boston Fed and, especially, the
Chicago Fed should be early critics of the refla-
tion program is therefore no mystery.” (p. 972).
Declining interest rates and questions about
the willingness of the United States to maintain
the dollar’s gold convertibility led to deposit
withdrawals by foreigners, causing commercial
banks to raise further doubts about the pur-
chase program: “The continued loss of gold and
deposits put many New York banks in an in-
creasingly uncomfortable position. -- -Many
complained that the reflation program had
‘demoralized money and exchange markets’.””
Thus, pressure from member banks experienc-
ing falling earnings and deposit outflows and
the desire of some Reserve Banks to protect
their gold reserves caused the System to aban-
don its program of open market purchases.67
Epstein and Ferguson (1984) were the first to
explain Federal Reserve behavior during the
Depression as a response to pressure from com-
mercial bankers. Anderson, Shughart and Tolli-
son (1988) push this view to the extreme,
arguing that the principal aim of Fed policy dur-
ing the Depression was to enhance the long-run
profitability of member banks by eliminating
nonmember competitors. This, inturn, benefited
the Fed by increasing the proportion of the
banking system under its regulatory control:
The fall in the money supply presided over by
the monetary authority between 1929 and 1933
eliminated a large number of state-chartered
and small, federally-chartered institutions from
the commercial banking industry. The profits of
those banks that survived. --rose significantly
as a result. Coincidentally, the monetary con-
traction expanded the proportion of the com-
mercial banking system within the Fed’s
bureaucratic domain. Thus, rather than
representing the leading example of bureaucratic
ineptitude, the Great Contraction may instead
be the leading example of rational regulatory
policy operating for the benefit of the regula-
tors and the regulated.”
Nonmember banks made up 75 percent of the
banks that suspended operations between 1930
and 1933. Failures were highest among small in-
stitutions located in rural areas. Policymakers
typically argued that such failures were caused
by bad management or transportation improve-
ments that made many banks redundant. George
Harrison, Governor of the New York Reserve
Bank, for example, testified before the Senate
Banking Committee in 1931 that:
-- with the automobile and improved roads, the
smaller banks. --with nominal capital, out in
the small rural communities, no longer had any
reason really to exist. Their depositors wel-
comed the opportunity to get into their automo-
biles and go to the large centers where they
could put their money.°°
66Epstein and Ferguson (1984), p. 975.
‘“in a comment on Epstein and Ferguson, Coelho and San-
toni (1991) present econometric evidence suggesting that
banks did not suffer reduced profits as a result of the
Fed’s 1932 purchases, and they question whether pres-
sure from commercial banks caused the Fed to end its
program. Indeed, they even doubt that expansionary policy
was ended since the monetary base continued to rise. Ep-
stein and Ferguson (1991) present additional qualitative
evidence showing that banks thought that low interest
rates had reduced their earnings.
“Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988), pp. 8-9.
“U.S. Senate (1931), p. 44.
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From the Federal Reserve’s inception, Fed offi-
cials argued that it was important that all banks
join the System. Benjamin Strong argued in 1915
that “no reform of our banking methods in this
country will be complete and satisfactory to the
country until it includes all banks. --in one
comprehensive system.”°Policymakers were
likely less concerned with the failure of non-
member banks than they were with the health
of member banks.” But it remains to be shown
that Federal Reserve policies were deliberately
intended to cause the failure of thousands of
nonmember institutions.
Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988) argue
that “the Great Depression... was a by-product
of economically rational behavior on the part of
Federal Reserve member banks seeking rents
through the elimination of their nonmember
rivals.” (p. 9) Member banks did not capture the
Fed directly, they argue, but rather exerted
pressure through members of the House and
Senate Banking Committees. To test this hypoth-
esis, the authors regress deposits in failed non-
member banks in each state on dummy varia-
bles indicating whether a state was represented
on the House or Senate Banking Committees.”
They find that nonmember bank losses were
higher if a state had a representative on the
House Banking Committee. This, they argue,
supports their view that the Fed deliberately
caused nonmember bank failures to be highest
in states having a congressman on the Banking
Committee, thereby enhancing the long-run
profits of the member banks that remained. The
Fed’s payoff came in 1933 when it was freed
from having to return a portion of its revenues
to the Treasury.”
This explanation of Federal Reserve policy
provokes a number of questions. Left unclear,
for example, is why member banks had more
influence over Congress than nonmember banks.
Nor is it explained how the Fed was able to af-
fect the fortunes of nonmember banks in partic-
ular states with the tools at its disposal. The Fed
cannot control the destination of reserve flows
generated by open market operations, and the
discount window was not open to nonmember
banks. Perhaps Fed officials could have selec-
tively restricted credit to member banks that
lent to nonmember banks in particular states,
but it is doubtful that such a circuitous route
would have had a large impact on losses.
Huberman (1990) casts further- doubt on the
Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988) view.
He notes that, although 75 percent of banks
that suspended during the Depression were
nonmember banks, the ratio of nonmember to
member bank suspensions from 1930 to 1933
was lower than it had been during the 1920s.
Nonmember banks that suspended, mom-cover,
reopened twice as often as member banks.
Membership in the Federal Reserve System
grew’ at a comparatively low rate during the
Depression.
Santoni and Van Cott (1990) also report evi-
dence contrary to the Anderson, Shughart and
Tollison hypothesis. They calculate a share price
index for large New York City member banks
and show that, relative to both the wholesale
commodity price index and the Standard and
Poor’s index, bank share prices declined sub-
stantially from 1929 to 1934. They show also
that the index of bank stock prices was not af-
fected by changes in the money supply, suggest-
ing that monetary policy did not enhance the
fortunes of banks in their sample.~~
CONCLUSION
The Federal Reserve’s failure to respond
vigorously to the Great Depression probably
cannot be attributed to a single cause. Each of
the explanations discussed in this article clarifies
certain points about Fed behavior during the
Depression. A number of contemporary observ-
ers, both within and outside the System, attrib-
70Quoted by Chandler (1958), p. 80.
“Friedman and Schwartz, pp. 358-59, also make this point.
7tThey include deposits in failed member banks, total bank
deposits, and other control variables as additional
regressors.
“Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988), pp. 16-17.
74Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1990) reply by pointing
out that member bank share prices rose dramatically rela-
tive to those of nonmember banks during 1930. Even the
share prices of “small” member banks rose relative to
those of nonmember institutions. Neither study tests
whether the profits of surviving member banks were en-
hanced in the long run, although the former note that in
1936 the average national bank profit rate was higher than
in 1925. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine
whether the increase in bank profits was caused by the
demise of nonmember banks or by New Deal reforms,
such as deposit interest rate ceilings, deposit insurance,
and increased chartering requirements, which reduced
competition and enhanced bank charter values.uted some of the blame to what they viewed as
excessively easy monetary policy during reces-
sions in 1924 and 1927. They argued that the
Fed’s actions had promoted stock market specu-
lation and led inevitably to the crash and
Depression. The best policy during the Depres-
sion, according to these observers, was to pro-
mote loan liquidation and wage rate reductions,
to allow recovery on a “sound basis.” While
those officials subscribing to the liquidationist
view did not win approval of open market sales,
they were able to prevent significant open mar-
ket purchases until 1932. It is likely that the
Fed would not have made large purchases even
then without pressure from major bankers and
Congress.
The most important explanations of Federal
Reserve behavior during the Depression,
however, appear to be the dedication of
policymakers to preserving the gold standard
and their attachment to policy guides that gave
erroneous information about monetary condi-
tions. Benjamin Strong’s death robbed the Sys-
tem of an intelligent leader at a crucial time and
undoubtedly imparted a contractionary bias to
monetary policy during the Depression. It seems
clear, however, that Strong’s death did not
cause a fundamental change in regime. Strong
believed in the gold standard, and he would not
likely have done anything to jeopardize gold
convertibility of the dollar. There was also little
deviation from either the gold sterilization or
the countercyclical policy rules that Strong had
developed during the 1920s—at least until the
fourth quarter of 1931, when maintenance of
the gold standard became the overriding goal of
policy. Thus, while leadership changes and in-
terest group pressure probably had some effect,
monetary policy during the Depression was not
fundamentally different from that of previous
years. Federal Reserve errors seem largely at-
tributable to the continued use of flawed
policies.
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